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Abstract. Differential games with asymmetric information were introduced by Cardaliaguet
(2007). As in repeated games with lack of information on both sides (Aumann and Maschler
(1995)), each player receives a private signal (his type) before the game starts and has a prior
belief about his opponent’s type. Then, a differential game is played in which the dynamic
and the payoff function depend on both types: each player is thus partially informed about the
differential game that is played. The existence of the value function and some characterizations
have been obtained under the assumption that the signals are drawn independently. In this paper,
we drop this assumption and extend these two results to the general case of correlated types. This
result is then applied to repeated games with incomplete information: the characterization of the
asymptotic value obtained by Rosenberg and Sorin (2001) and Laraki (2001) for the independent
case is extended to the general case.
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1 Introduction
Differential games with incomplete information were introduced by Cardaliaguet [4], com-
bining the aspects of classical differential games with the informational issues introduced
by Aumann and Maschler [1] in the study of repeated games. More precisely, the game
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consists in a dynamic
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)), t ∈ [t0, T ], x(t0) = x0,
where u (resp. v) is the control played by the first (resp. second) player, and a family of
payoff functions
J kℓ(t0, x0) =
∫ T
t0
γkℓ(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+ gkℓ(x(T )), (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L,
where K and L are two finite sets. Before the game starts, the type k (resp. ℓ) of player
1 (resp. 2) is drawn according to a probability distribution p (resp. q) over K (resp. L).
Each player knows (or is informed of) his type only. Player 1 (resp. 2) aims at maximizing
(resp. minimizing) the payoff. The main result of [4] is that, under standard regularity
assumptions of the dynamic and the payoff functions and under Isaacs’ condition, the
game has a value. Moreover, as a function of the initial time t0, the initial position x0
and of p and q, the value is characterized as the unique dual solution of some Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs. The notion of dual solution is the following: the function V (t0, x0, · , · )
is concave-convex and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (p, q), the concave conjugate
of the value function with respect to p is a sub-solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
equation, while the convex conjugate of the value function with respect to q is a super-
solution of the same equation.
The present paper is concerned with the same problem, dropping the (important) as-
sumption that the players’ types are drawn independently. Considering correlated types
is referred to as the dependent case in the literature of repeated games, as opposed to the
independent case: the pair of types is drawn according to some probability distribution
over K × L, which is not necessarily a direct product p⊗ q. Using the decomposition of
a probability measure over the product set K × L, as the direct product of a marginal
probability and a matrix of conditional probabilities, one obtains analogue results fol-
lowing the main lines of [4]. These two components replace the couple of independent
probabilities in the formulation of a new system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations that
characterizes the value of the game. Our result is then applied to repeated games with
incomplete information, leading to a characterization of the asymptotic value in the spirit
of Rosenberg and Sorin (2001) and Laraki (2001) (a pair of inequalities written only on
the extreme points of the graph of the value function).
To underline the relevance of the dependent case we refer to Sorin and Zamir [21]: ”the
dependent case is not only conceivable but seems to be rather the typical case : whenever
the states of the world or the types in question contain also the beliefs, as is typically the
situation, the dependent case seems unavoidable”. However, our paper is the first in the
literature on differential games with asymmetric information [4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23] to
treat the dependent case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce differential games with
asymmetric information and define the sets of strategies (deterministic and random).
Then, we shortly describe some concepts from the theory of P.D.E’s and from convex
analysis. Section 3 is devoted to our main results.
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2 Differential games with asymmetric information
A (standard, zero-sum) differential game is described by an initial state, a dynamic, a
running payoff and a terminal payoff. A differential game with asymmetric information
G(t0, x0, π) is described by two finite sets K and L, a probability distribution π ∈ ∆(K ×
L)1, an initial time t0 ∈ [0, 1] and a family of differential games indexed by (k, ℓ) ∈ K×L,
with initial positions xkℓ0 . It is played as follows:
• First, a pair of parameters (or types) (k, ℓ) ∈ K×L is drawn according to π: player
1 is informed only about k, player 2 only about ℓ.
• Second, the differential game (xkℓ0 , f
kℓ, γkℓ, gkℓ) is played on [t0, 1], where
– xkℓ0 ∈ R
n is the initial state,
– fkℓ : [0, 1]× Rn × U × V → Rn is a dynamic,
– γkℓ : [0, 1]× Rn × U × V → R, is a running payoff function, and
– gkℓ : Rn → R is a terminal payoff function.
A crucial aspect of this model is the fact that, unlike standard differential games, none of
the players knows the true state of the world, i.e. each player is partially informed about
the game that is being played.
A control for player 1 (resp. 2) is a Lebesgue-measurable mapping from [t0, 1] to U
(resp. V ). Elements of U and V are identified with constant controls. The set of controls
are denoted by U(t0) and V(t0) respectively.
The following assumptions on f, γ and g are standard.
Assumption 2.1. For each (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L,
(a) fkℓ and γkℓ are uniformly bounded, uniformly Lipschitz in (t, x) and continuous.
(b) gkℓ is Lipschitz continuous and bounded.
Assumption 2.1 ensures that, for any pair of controls (u,v) ∈ U(t0) × V(t0), the
following O.D.E. has a unique solution, modulo equality a.e.2{
x˙
kℓ(t) = fkℓ(t,x(t),u(t),v(t)), a.e. on [t0, 1]
x
kℓ(t0) = x
kℓ
0 .
Its solution is the trajectory induced by the couple (u,v). It belongs to C1([t0, 1];R
n) and
is denoted by xkℓ[t0, x
kℓ
0 ,u,v]. The next assumption corresponds to perfect monitoring
(i.e. observation of the past actions) in repeated games.
1For any finite set X , ∆(X) := {a : X → [0, 1],
∑
x∈X
a(x) = 1} denotes the set of probability
distributions over X .
2a.e. is an abbreviation for almost everywhere.
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Assumption 2.2. The players observe the past controls, i.e. at time t ∈ [t0, 1],
(u(s),v(s))s∈[t0,t]
is commonly known by the players.
Both players know the description of the game. Player 1 (resp. 2) aims at maximizing
(resp. minimizing) the following payoff functional:
J kℓ(t0, x0,u,v) :=
∫ 1
t0
γkℓ(s,xkℓ[t0, x
kℓ
0 ,u,v](s),u(s),v(s)ds+ g
kℓ
(
x
kℓ[t0, x
kℓ
0 ,u,v](1)
)
.
Remark 2.3. Standard differential games correspond to the case where both K and L
are singletons, i.e. |K| = |L| = 1. Differential games with incomplete information on
one side correspond to the case where either |K| = 1 or |L| = 1. The case where π is a
product measure (i.e. there exist p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L) such that π = p⊗ q) is known
as the independent case.
2.1 Reduction
Without loss of generality, the following simplification of the model is assumed:
(a) There is no running payoff, i.e. γkℓ ≡ 0 for all (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L;
(b) The dynamic and the initial position do not depend on the types, i.e. only the
terminal payoff function is type dependent.
The differential game with asymmetric information G(t0, x0, π) is then described by fol-
lowing 5-tuple (t0, x0, f, g, π), where g = (g
kℓ)kℓ is a family of payoff functions indexed by
K and L.
Let us briefly explain why this reduction is possible (we refer the reader to the Appendix
for more details). The past controls being commonly observed, at time t both players
can compute the K × L potential integral payoffs and positions induced by the pair of
controls that have been played so far, i.e. in the interval [t0, t]. An auxiliary state variable
in (R × Rn)K×L, which includes this information, can thus be observed by both players.
As a consequence, one can construct an auxiliary game satisfying (a) and (b), and which
is strategically equivalent to the initial model.
2.2 Strategies
Let us define two sets of strategies: deterministic and random. In both cases, the definition
of the strategy involves some partition of [t0, 1]: the choice of the partition is part of the
strategy. The main property of these sets is that any pair of strategies (and of a random
event) determine a unique trajectory, and thus a unique outcome. The game is then said
to be in normal form.
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2.2.1 Deterministic strategies
Definition 2.4. A map α : V(t0) → U(t0) is a (deterministic) strategy for player 1 if
there exists a finite partition of [t0, 1], t0 = s0 < s1 < · · · < sN = 1, such that for all
v1,v2 ∈ V(t0) and 0 ≤ m < N :
v1 = v2 a.e. on [s0, sm] =⇒ α(v1) = α(v2) a.e. on [s0, sm+1].
Strategies are defined similarly for player 2. Denote by A(t0) (resp. B(t0)) the set of
strategies of player 1 (resp. 2). As opposed to nonanticipative strategies, the following
propety holds ([8, Lemma 1]):
For any couple of strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t0)× B(t0), there exists a unique pair (u,v) ∈
U(t0)× V(t0) such that α(v) = u and β(u) = v a.e. on [t0, 1].
For any (α, β) ∈ A(t0)×B(t0), we denote by x[t0, x0, α, β] ∈ C
1([t0, 1];R
n) the trajectory
induced by α and β, i.e. by the unique pair (u,v) ∈ U(t0) × V(t0) such that α(v) = u
and β(u) = v a.e. on [t0, 1].
2.2.2 Random strategies
The definition of random strategies involves a set S of (non trivial) probability spaces,
which has to be stable by finite product. For simplicity, let
S = {([0, 1]n,B([0, 1]n),Ln), for some n ∈ N
∗}
where B([0, 1]n) is the σ-algebra of Borel sets and Ln is the Lebesgue measure on R
n.
Endow the set of controls U(0) with the topology of the L1-convergence, i.e. un converges
to u if limn→∞
∫ 1
0
dU(un(t),u(t))dt = 0, where dU is the metric of U .
Definition 2.5. A random strategy for Player 1 is a pair ((Ωα,Fα,Pα), α), where
(Ωα,Fα,Pα) belongs to the set of probability spaces S and α : Ωα×V(t0)→ U(t0) satisfies
• α is a measurable function from Ωα×V(t0) to U(t0), with Ωα endowed with the σ-field
Fα and U(t0) and V(t0) with the Borel σ-field associated with the L
1 topology.
• There exists a partition of [t0, 1], t0 = s0 < s1 < · · · < sN = 1 such that, for any
0 ≤ m ≤ N , ω ∈ Ωα, and v1,v2 ∈ V(t0):
v1 = v2 a.e. on [s0, sm]⇒ α(ω,v1) = α(ω,v2) a.e. on [s0, sm+1].
Denote by Ar(t0) the set of random strategies for Player 1. The set of random strategies
for player 2 is defined similarly, and is denoted by Br(t0).
Notation 2.6. For simplicity, an element in Ar(t0) is simply denoted by α. The under-
lying probability space being always denoted by (Ωα,Fα,Pα).
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As for the deterministic case, random strategies lead to a normal-form representation
of the game ([4]):
Lemma 2.1. For any pair (α, β) ∈ Ar(t0) × Br(t0) and any ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ωα × Ωβ,
there exists a unique pair (uω,vω) ∈ U(t0)× V(t0) such that:
α(ω1,vω) = uω, and β(ω2,uω) = vω. (2.1)
Moreover, the map ρ : Ωα ×Ωβ → U(t0)×V(t0), ω 7→ (uω,vω) is measurable with respect
to the Fα ⊗ Fβ σ-field, and the topology of the L
1-convergence.
A direct consequence of Lemma 2.1 is that to each pair (α, β) ∈ Ar(t0)×Br(t0) and to
each event ω ∈ Ωα×Ωβ corresponds a unique trajectory, denoted by x[t0, x0, α(ω), β(ω)].
A strategy of player 1 in the game G(t0, x0, π) is a vector of random strategies αˆ =
(αˆk)k∈K , where α
k ∈ Ar(t0) for each k. Similarly, player 2’s set of strategies is Br(t0)
L.
Remark 2.7. Random strategies contain deterministic ones, and the latter contain the
set of controls, i.e. U(t0) ⊂ A(t0) ⊂ Ar(t0) ⊂ Ar(t0)
K .
Let us introduce some useful notation.
Notation 2.8. For any pair of strategies (αˆ, βˆ) ∈ Ar(t0)
K × Br(t0)
L and measure µ ∈
∆(K × L), the expected payoff is defined as follows:
E
µ
αˆ,βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
X
t0,x0,αˆk,βˆℓ
1 (ω)
)]
=
∑
K×L
µkℓ
∫
Ωα×Ωβ
gkℓ
(
X
t0,x0,αˆk,βˆℓ
1 (ω)
)
dPα ⊗ dPβ(ω),
where Xt0,x0,αˆ
k,βˆℓ
t (ω) := x[t0, x0, αˆ
k(ω), βˆℓ(ω)](t). This expectation makes sense: the map
(u,v) 7→ x[t0, x0,u,v](t) is continuous in the topology of the L
1-convergence, so that the
maps
ω 7→ gkℓ(Xt0,x0,αˆ
k,βˆℓ
1 (ω)), (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L
are measurable in Ωα × Ωβ and bounded.
2.3 The upper and lower value functions
The upper and lower value functions V−,V+ : [0, 1]× Rn ×∆(K × L) → R are defined
by
V
−(t0, x0, π) := sup
αˆ∈Ar(t0)K
inf
βˆ∈Br(t0)L
E
π
αˆ,βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
X
t0,x0,αˆk,βˆℓ
1 (ω)
)]
,
V
+(t0, x0, π) := inf
βˆ∈Br(t0)L
sup
αˆ∈Ar(t0)K
E
π
αˆ,βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
X
t0,x0,αˆk,βˆℓ
1 (ω)
)]
.
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The inequality V− ≤ V+ holds everywhere. The value exists if V− = V+, and we denote
the common function by V. Introduce the lower and upper Hamiltonians, H−, H+ :
[0, 1]× Rn × Rn → R as follows:
H−(t, x, ξ) := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
〈f(t, x, u, v), ξ〉,
H+(t, x, ξ) := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
〈f(t, x, u, v), ξ〉.
We are mostly concerned with the existence of the value function and its characterization.
Unlike standard differential games, where one can identify V− (resp. V+) as the unique
viscosity solution of a (first-order) Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation with Hamiltonian H−
(resp. H+), there is little hope in characterizing V− (resp. V+) in the context of differen-
tial games with asymmetric information. Rather, we will characterize the value function
V, when it exists. Isaacs’ condition holds in the rest of the paper:
Isaacs’ condition. H−(t, x, ξ) = H+(t, x, ξ) for all (t, x, ξ) ∈ [0, 1]× Rn × Rn.
We denote by H the common Hamiltonian. Cardaliaguet [4] established the existence
of the value function under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and Isaacs condition, in the case where
k and ℓ are drawn independently. The value function was characterized as the unique dual
solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation:
∂tw(t, x) +H(t, x,Dw(t, x)) = 0, on (0, 1)× R
n. (2.2)
The definition of dual solutions involves the Fenchel conjugate and the notion of viscosity
solutions introduced by Crandall and Lions [12], and used in the framework of differential
games for the first time by Evans and Souganidis [14]. Precisely, the notion of dual solution
is the following: the function V (t0, x0, · , · ) is concave-convex and Lipschitz continuous
with respect to (p, q), the concave conjugate of the value function with respect to p is a
sub-solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation, while the convex conjugate of the
value function with respect to q is a super-solution of the same equation. The extension
of this notion to the general, dependent case is left to Theorem 3.1.
2.4 Tools
In this section, we start by defining a notion of convexity for functions defined in∆(K×L).
Our definition goes back to Heuer [16] and is equivalent, yet easier to handle, to the
notion of I-convexity given by Mertens and Zamir [17]. Second, we recall the definition of
viscosity solutions, and of some classical objects from convex analysis, such as the Fenchel
conjugate and the sub-gradients.
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2.4.1 Convexity in ∆(K × L)
For any probability measure µ ∈ ∆(K × L), let µK ∈ ∆(K) denote its marginal on K
(resp. L) and let µL|K ∈ ∆(L)K be the matrix of conditional probabilities, i.e.:
µK(k) :=
∑
ℓ∈L
µ(k, ℓ) and µL|K(ℓ|k) :=
µ(k, ℓ)
µK(k)
.
The probability µ is the direct product of µK and µL|K , i.e.
µ(k, ℓ) = µK(k)µL|K(ℓ|k), for all (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L.
Similarly, µ = µL ⊗ µK|L, where µL ∈ ∆(L) is the marginal on L and µK|L ∈ ∆(K)L is
the matrix of conditionals on K given ℓ.
Notation 2.9. Let ϕ : ∆(K ×L)→ R be some map, and let Q ∈ ∆(L)K be some matrix
of conditional probabilities. We denote by ϕK( · , Q) : ∆(K)→ R the following function:
ϕK(p,Q) := ϕ(p⊗Q), for all p ∈ ∆(K).
Similarly, one defines ϕL(P, · ) : ∆(L) → R for any P ∈ ∆(K)
L as follows:
ϕL(P, q) := ϕ(q ⊗ P ), for all q ∈ ∆(L).
Definition 2.10. The map ϕ : ∆(K × L)→ R is
• K-concave if ϕK( · , Q) is concave on K, for all Q ∈ ∆(L)
K ;
• L-convex if ϕL(P, · ) is convex on L, for all P ∈ ∆(K)
L;
Fenchel duality
Definition 2.11. For any ϕ : Rn → [−∞,+∞], the Fenchel transform of ϕ, denoted by
ϕ∗ is defined by ϕ∗ : Rn → [−∞,+∞], ϕ∗(x∗) = supx∈Rn〈x, x
∗〉 − ϕ(x).
Here, we define two slightly different transforms which are more convenient in the
framework of games with incomplete information. The reason is that they correspond to
the dual operators, one for each player, in the general theory of duality for games with
incomplete information (see [20, Section 4.6]).
Definition 2.12. Let ϕ : Rn → R. Define its upper and lower conjugates ϕ♯, ϕ♭ : Rn → R
as follows:
ϕ♯(x) := sup
y∈Rn
ϕ(y)− 〈y, x〉,
ϕ♭(y) := inf
x∈Rn
ϕ(x) + 〈x, y〉.
For all x, y ∈ Rn the following relations are straightforward:
ϕ♯(x) = (−ϕ)∗(−x), and ϕ♭(y) = −ϕ∗(−y).
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Sub-gradients
Definition 2.13. For any ϕ : Rn → [−∞,+∞] and x ∈ Rn, the sub-differential of ϕ at
x is defined as follows:
∂−ϕ(x) := {x∗ ∈ Rn |ϕ(x) + 〈x∗, y − x〉 ≤ ϕ(y), ∀y ∈ Rn}.
The super-differential ∂+ϕ(x) is defined similarly. The following result can be found
in [19, Section 12].
Theorem 2.14 (Fenchel equality). Let ϕ : Rn → R∪{+∞} be convex and proper. Then
x∗ ∈ ∂−ϕ(x) if and only if ϕ∗(x∗) + ϕ(x) = 〈x, x∗〉.
Next, let us state a useful, straightforward lemma which follows directly from Fenchel
equality and the definitions of ∂− and ∂+.
Notation 2.15. Without further mention, functions defined on ∆(K) (resp. ∆(L)) are
extended to RK (resp. RL) by −∞ (resp. +∞) in RK\∆(K) (resp. RL\∆(L)). The
sub-differentials (resp. super-differentials) of f are defined according to this extension.
Lemma 2.2. Let ϕ : ∆(K)→ R be a concave function and let x ∈ ∂+ϕ(p). Then,
ϕ♯(x) = ϕ(p)− 〈x, p〉 ≥ ϕ(p′)− 〈x, p′〉, ∀p′ ∈ ∆(K).
Similarly, if φ : ∆(L)→ R is convex and y ∈ ∂−φ(q), then
φ♭(−y) = φ(q) + 〈−y, q〉 ≤ φ(q′) + 〈−y, q′〉, ∀q′ ∈ ∆(L).
Note that the scalar products in Lemma 2.2 are in RK and RL, respectively.
Definition 2.16. Given ϕ : ∆(K) → R, let Eϕ denote the set of extreme points of ϕ on
∆(K). Explicitly, p ∈ Eϕ if the equality (p, ϕ(p)) =
∑
r∈R λr(pr, ϕ(pr)) with R finite and
λ ∈ ∆(R), λ≫ 0 and pr ∈ ∆(K) implies pr = p for all r ∈ R.
Lemma 2.3. Let ϕ : ∆(K) → R be a concave function. Then ϕ♯ is differentiable at
x0 ∈ R
K if and only if p0 := −∇ϕ
♯(x0) ∈ ∆(K) is an extreme point of ϕ.
Proof. It follows directly form the Envelope Theorem.
Viscosity solutions
Definition 2.17 (Viscosity solutions). A map w : [0, 1]× Rn → R is a
• (viscosity) super-solution of (2.2) if it is lower-semi-continuous in (0, 1)× Rn and
if, for any test function ϕ ∈ C1([0, 1]×Rn;R) such that w−ϕ has a local minimum
at some point (t, x) ∈ (0, 1)× Rn, one has:
∂tϕ(t, x) +H(t, x,Dϕ(t, x)) ≤ 0.
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• (viscosity) sub-solution of (2.2) if it is upper-semi-continuous in (0, 1)×Rn and if,
for any test function φ ∈ C1([0, 1]×Rn;R) such that w− φ has a local maximum at
some point (t, x) ∈ (0, 1)× Rn, one has:
∂tφ(t, x) +H(t, x,Dφ(t, x)) ≥ 0.
• viscosity solution of (2.2) if it is both a super-solution and a sub-solution.
Three basic properties of viscosity solutions are existence, uniqueness and stability
with respect to uniform convergence.
3 Main results
In this section we state and prove our main result: the existence and characterization of
the value function for differential games with asymmetric and correlated information.
We can now state our main result. In the sequel, sub-solutions (resp. super-solutions)
refer to viscosity sub-solutions (resp. super-solutions).
Theorem 3.1 (Existence and characterization of the value V). Assume Isaacs condition.
Then, the value exists and is the unique Lipschitz continuous function on [0, 1] × Rn ×
∆(K × L) satisfying:
- p 7→ VK(t, x, p, Q) is concave for all (t, x, Q) ∈ [0, 1]× R
n ×∆(L)K,
- q 7→ VL(t, x, P, q) is convex for all (t, x, P ) ∈ [0, 1]× R
n ×∆(K)L,
- For all (ζ, Q) ∈ RK ×∆(L)K , (t, x) 7→ V♯K(t, x, ζ, Q) is a sub-solution of (2.2).
- For all (P, η) ∈ ∆(K)L × RL, (t, x) 7→ V♭L(t, x, P, η) is a super-solution of (2.2).
- V(1, x, π) =
∑
k,ℓ π
kℓgkℓ(xkℓ), for all (x, π) ∈ Rn ×∆(K × L).
Remark 3.2. The characterization of the value function in Theorem 3.1 gives an explicit
definition of what was called a dual solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2.2) in [4].
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We follow the main ideas in the proof of [4]. Also, we use the duality techniques introduced
by De Meyer [13] for games with incomplete information on one side (see [20, Chapter 2]
for a general presentation), and extended in [15] to the case of general type dependence.
The proof can be summarized as follows.
Step 1. One proves the K-concavity, L-convexity and Lipschitz continuity of both the
upper and the lower value functions. These results being classical, we have preferred to
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omit the proof.
Step 2. One proves a sub-dynamic programming principle for V+♯K at fixed (ζ, Q).
For that, we use an alternative expression for V+♯K (t, x, ζ, Q) which, again, is a general
property of any normal-form game with incomplete information. We then deduce that
(t, x) 7→ V+♯(t, x, ζ, Q) is a sub-solution of (2.2). Symmetrical results hold for V−♭ by
exchanging the roles of the players: (t, x) 7→ V−♭(t, x, P, η) is a super-solution of (2.2).
Step 3. One concludes using a new comparison theorem inspired by the analog result
in [4]. Here, Assumption 2.1 ensures that the Hamiltonian is regular enough.
3.2 Regularity
Lemma 3.1. The upper and lower value function are K-concave, L-convex and Lipschitz
continuous.
The K-concavity, L-convexity and the Lipschitz continuity with respect to π ∈ ∆(K×
L) is standard for games with incomplete information (see [20, Chapter 2]). The proof is
omitted, for there is nothing particular to our model. The regularity in (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]×Rn
follows from the assumptions on f , γ and g (see, for instance, [3]).
3.3 Sub-dynamic programming principle
Proposition 3.1. For all (ζ, Q) ∈ RK ×∆(L)K , t, t+ h ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ Rn:
V
+♯
K (t, x, ζ, Q) ≤ inf
β∈B(t)
sup
α∈A(t)
V
+♯
K (t+ h,x[t, x, α, β](t+ h), ζ, Q).
Proof. Consider the following alternative expression for V+♯K (t, x, ζ, Q), which is a general
property of normal-form games with convex sets of strategies (see [20, Chapter 2]):
V
+♯
K (t, x, ζ, Q) = inf
βˆ∈Br(t)L
sup
α∈Ar(t)
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
α,βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α(ω), β(ω)](1)
)]
− ζk. (3.1)
Recall that ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ωα × Ωβ . Using the convexity of the map z 7→ maxk∈K z
k,
one can replace the random strategy of player 1 by a deterministic one. Indeed, for any
random strategy α ∈ Ar(t), one has
maxk∈K E
k,Q
α,βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α(ω), β(ω)](1)
)]
− ζk
= maxk∈K
∫
Ωα
E
k,Q
βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α(ω1), β(ω2)](1)
)]
dPα(ω1)− ζ
k,
≤
∫
Ωα
maxk∈K
(
E
k,Q
βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α(ω1), β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk
)
dPα(ω1),
≤ supω1∈Ωα maxk∈K E
k,Q
βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α(ω1), β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk.
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On the other hand, clearly supα∈Ar(t) supω1∈Ωα = supα∈A(t). It follows that
V
+♯
K (t, x, ζ, Q) ≤ inf
βˆ∈Br(t)L
sup
α∈A(t)
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α, β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk. (3.2)
For any βˆ ∈ Br(t), the regularity assumptions on f and g ensure the Lipschitz-continuity
of the map
x 7→ sup
α∈A(t)
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
βˆ
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α, β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk.
Notation 3.3. We say that βˆ is ε-optimal for V+♯K (t, x, ζ, Q) if it reaches the infimum in
the formulation (3.2) up to ε.
For any ε > 0, let δ > 0 be such that if βˆy is ε-optimal for V+♯K (t, y, ζ, Q), for some
y ∈ Rn, then βˆy is 2ε-optimal for V+♯K (t, y
′, ζ, Q) for any y′ ∈ B(y, δ).
The set of reachable points at time t+ h is clearly contained in B(x, ‖f‖). Let (xi)i∈I
be a finite family of points such that
⋃
i∈I B(xi, δ) covers B(x, ‖f‖), and let Ei be a Borel
partition of B(x, ‖f‖) such that, for all i ∈ I, Ei ⊂ B(xi, δ). We aim at proving (3.1)
by explicitly constructing a strategy βˆε ∈ Br(t) for player 2 which is ε-optimal in (3.2).
Intuitively, the strategy is as follows:
- Play β0 ∈ B(t) on [t, t + h], where β0 is ε-optimal in the right-hand-side of (3.1).
- If x[t, x, α, β](t+ h) belongs to Ei, then play in the remaining of the game [t+ h, 1]
a strategy βˆi ∈ Br(t+ h) which is ε-optimal for V
+♯
K (t+ h, xi, ζ, Q).
Let us define βˆε formally. For i ∈ I and ℓ ∈ L, let (Ω
ℓ
i ,F
ℓ
i ,P
ℓ
i) = (Ωβˆℓi
,Fβˆℓi
,Pβˆℓi
) be the
probability space associated to βˆℓi , and let t + h = s0 < s1 < · · · < sN = 1 be a common
partition to all βˆℓi . This is possible because I × L is finite. For any ℓ ∈ L, let
(Ωℓ,F ℓ,Pℓ) =
(∏
i∈I
Ωℓi ,⊗i∈IF
ℓ
i ,⊗i∈IP
ℓ
i
)
,
which belongs to S. It is the probability space associated to βˆℓε. Now, for any ω
ℓ =
(ωℓi )i∈I ∈ Ω
ℓ and u ∈ U(t), let
βˆℓε(ω
ℓ,u)(s) =
{
β0(u)(s), if s ∈ [t, t+ h],
βℓi (ω
ℓ
i ,u
′(s)), if s ∈ [t+ h, 1], and x[t, x,u, β0](t + h) ∈ Ei,
where u′ denotes the restriction of u to [t + h, 1]. Let α ∈ A(t) be a strategy of player
1, and let (u0,v0) be (the unique pair) such that α(v0) = u0 and β0(u0) = v0 a.e. on
[t, t+h]. For any v′ ∈ V(t+h), let v′◦v0 ∈ V(t) be the control obtained by concatenating
v0 and v
′ at time t + h. Define α′ ∈ A(t + h) by the relation α′(v′) := α(v′ ◦ v0). Now,
by the choice of βˆε, the following relation holds for any (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L and ω
ℓ ∈ Ωℓ:
gkℓ(x[t, x, α, βˆℓε(ω
ℓ)](1) =
∑
i∈I
gkℓ
(
x
[
t + h,Xt,x,α,β0t+h , α
′, βˆℓi (ω
ℓ
i )
]
(1)
)
1Fi, (3.3)
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where Xt,x,α,β0t+h = x[t, x, α, β0](t + h) and Fi = {X
t,x,α,β0
t+h ∈ Ei}.
We claim that
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
βˆε
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α, β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk ≤ V+♯K (t+ h,X
t,x,α,β0
t+h , ζ, Q) + 2ε. (3.4)
Proof of the claim. From (3.3), one deduces the following equality:
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
βˆε
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α, β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk =
max
k∈K
∑
i∈I
gkℓ
(
x
[
t + h,Xt,x,α,β0t+h , α
′, βˆℓi (ω
ℓ
i )
]
(1)
)
1Fi − ζ
k. (3.5)
The convexity of z 7→ maxk∈K z
k implies that (3.5) is smaller than:
∑
i∈I
sup
α′∈A(t+h)
max
k∈K
(
gkℓ
(
x
[
t+ h,Xt,x,α,β0t+h , α
′, βˆℓi (ω
ℓ
i )
]
(1)
)
− ζk
)
1Fi. (3.6)
By the choice of βˆi, (3.6) is smaller than
∑
i∈I
(
V
+♯
K
(
t + h,Xt,x,α,β0t+h , ζ, Q
)
+ 2ε
)
1Fi, (3.7)
which is equal to V+♯K (t + h,X
t,x,α,β0
t+h , ζ, Q) + 2ε, so that the claim follows.
Taking the inf βˆ∈Br(t) supα∈A(t) in both sides of (3.4), one obtains
inf
βˆ∈Br(t)
sup
α∈A(t)
max
k∈K
E
k,Q
βˆε
[
gkℓ
(
x[t, x, α, β(ω2)](1)
)]
− ζk ≤ sup
α∈A(t)
V
+♯
K (t+ h,X
t,x,α,β0
t+h , ζ, Q) + 2ε,
≤ inf
β∈B(t)
sup
α∈A(t)
V
+♯
K
(
t + h,Xt,x,α,βt+h , ζ, Q
)
+ 3ε.
The first inequality holds because the right-hand-side of (3.4) does not depend on βˆ. The
second, by the choice of β0. Together with (3.2), these inequalities complete the proof.
It is well-known that a function satisfying a sub-dynamic programming principle is a
sub-solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi equation. we refer the reader to [14] (resp.
[4]) for the case where the game is played with classical non-anticipative strategies (resp.
non-anticipative with delay, or discretized strategies).
Corollary 3.4. For any (ζ, Q) ∈ RK × ∆(L)K , the map (t, x) 7→ V+♯K (t, x, ζ, Q) is a
sub-solution of (2.2).
Reversing the roles of the players, one obtains the following result in the same manner.
Corollary 3.5. For any (P, η) ∈ ∆(K)L × RL, the map (t, x) 7→ V−♭L (t, x, P, η) is a
super-solution of (2.2).
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3.4 Comparison principle
Consider some general Hamilton-Jacobi equation, i.e. not necessarily depending on f :
∂tw(t, x) +H(t, x,Dw(t, x)) = 0, on (0, 1)× R
n. (H)
Suppose that the Hamiltonian H : [0, 1]× Rn × Rn → R is continuous and such that, for
all t, s ∈ [0, 1] and x, y, ξ ∈ Rn:
|H(t, x, ξ)−H(s, y, ξ)| ≤ C‖ξ‖(|t− s|+ ‖x− y‖), for some C ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.6 (Comparison principle). Let w1, w2 : [0, 1]× Rn ×∆(K × L) → R be two
Lipschitz continuous functions satisfying:
- w1K , w
2
K are concave on ∆(K) and w
1
L, w
2
L are convex on ∆(L),
- For all (ζ, Q) ∈ RK ×∆(L)K , (t, x) 7→ w2 ♯K (t, x, ζ, Q) is a sub-solution of (H),
- For all (P, η) ∈ ∆(K)L × RL, (t, x) 7→ w1 ♭L (t, x, P, η) is a super-solution of (H),
- w1(1, x, π) ≥ w2(1, x, π), for all (x, π) ∈ RN ×∆(K × L).
Then w1(t, x, π) ≥ w2(t, x, π), for all (t, x, π) ∈ [0, 1]× Rn ×∆(K × L).
This statement extends [4, Theorem 5.1] to the case of general type dependence. The
proof follows the same lines and is inspired in the proof of the Comparison Principle by
Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta [2, Theorem 3.7].
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, the existence of some (t′, x′, π′) ∈ [0, 1]×Rn×∆(K×L)
such that w2(t′, x′, π′) > w1(t′, x′, π′). Then, for some σ > 0,
sup
(t,x,π)
w2(t, x, π)− w1(t, x, π)− σ(1− t) > 0,
where the supremum is taken over [0, 1]× Rn ×∆(K × L). Let us consider the standard
method of separation of variables. To avoid technical details, we will assume that for
some R > 0, w1(t, x, π) ≥ w2(t, x, π) for all (t, x, π) with ‖x‖ > R. This assumption can
be omitted by using penalization arguments at infinity (see [2]). Let ε > 0 be fixed and
consider the following map:
(t, x, s, y, π) 7→ w2(s, y, π)− w1(t, x, π)−
1
ε
‖(s, y)− (t, x)‖2 − σ(1− t) > 0. (3.8)
It attains its maximum at some point, denoted by (tε, xε, sε, yε, πε). Let pε ∈ ∆(K), qε ∈
∆(L), Qε ∈ ∆(L)
K , Pε ∈ ∆(K)
L b such that
πε = pε ⊗Qε = qε ⊗ Pε.
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From usual arguments (see [2]), tε, sε < 1 for small ε, because w2(1, y, π)−w1(1, x, π) ≤ 0
and w1 and w2 are Lipschitz continuous. Moreover,
lim
ε→0+
1
ε
‖(sε, yε)− (tε, xε)‖
2 = 0.
Part 1. Here, we use that w1 ♭L is a super-solution to (H).
Fix (s, y, P ) = (sε, yε, Pε). Then, (tε, xε, qε) is a maximizer in (3.8) so that for all (t, x, q) ∈
[0, 1]× Rn ×∆(L),
w1L(t, x, Pε, q) ≥ w
1
L(tε, xε, Pε, qε) + w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, q)− w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, qε) + ϕ(t, x), (3.9)
where ϕ(t, x) = ϕ(tε,xε,sε,yε)(t, x) is defined as follows:
ϕ(t, x) :=
1
ε
(
‖(sε, yε)− (tε, xε)‖
2 − ‖(sε, yε)− (t, x)‖
2
)
+ σ(t− tε).
In particular, putting (t, x) = (tε, xε) and because ϕ(tε, xε) = 0, one has:
w1L(tε, xε, Pε, qε)− w
1
L(tε, xε, Pε, q) ≤ w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, qε)− w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, q). (3.10)
Let ηε be in the sub-differential of the convex function q 7→ w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, q) at qε, i.e.:
w2L(sε, yε, Pε, qε) + 〈ηε, q − qε〉 ≤ w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, q), ∀q ∈ ∆(L).
Then, by (3.10), ηε ∈ ∂
−
q w
1
L(tε, xε, Pε, qε) too. This implies (see Lemma 2.2) that:
w1 ♭L (tε, xε, Pε,−ηε) = w
1
L(tε, xε, Pε, qε) + 〈−ηε, qε〉,
w2 ♭L (sε, yε, Pε,−ηε) = w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, qε) + 〈−ηε, qε〉.
(3.11)
Taking the lower conjugate of (3.9) at −ηε, one obtains that
w1 ♭L (t, x, Pε,−ηε) ≥ w
1
L(tε, xε, Pε, qε) + w
2 ♭
L (sε, yε, Pε,−ηε)− w
2
L(sε, yε, Pε, qε) + ϕ(t, x).
(3.12)
Using the equalities in (3.11), we obtain that
w1 ♭L (t, x, Pε,−ηε) ≥ w
1 ♭
L (tε, xε, Pε,−ηε) + ϕ(t, x), (3.13)
with an equality at (t, x) = (tε, xε). The right-hand-side is a C
1-function, and can be
taken as a test function. Its derivatives are clearly those of ϕ, i.e.:
∂tϕ(tε, xε) = σ +
2
ε
(sε − tε),
Dϕ(tε, xε) =
2
ε
(yε − xε).
Finally, (t, x) 7→ w1 ♭L (t, x, Pε,−ηε) being a super-solution of (H), one has:
σ +
2
ε
(sε − tε) +H(tε, xε,
2
ε
(yε − xε)) ≤ 0. (3.14)
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Part 2. Symmetrically, we use here that w2 ♯K is a sub-solution to (H). We fix (t, x, Q) =
(tε, xε, Qε) and let (sε, yε, pε) be a maximizer in (3.8). As in Part 1, one obtains
w
2 ♯
K (s, y, ζε, Qε) ≤ w
2 ♯
K (sε, yε, ζε, Qε) + φ(s, y),
with an equality at (sε, yε), and where φ is a C
1 and satisfies:
∂tφ(tε, xε) =
2
ε
(sε − tε),
Dφ(tε, xε) =
2
ε
(yε − xε).
The mapping (t, x) 7→ w2 ♯K (t, x, ζε, Qε) being a sub-solution of (H), and using φ as a test
function one obtains:
2
ε
(sε − tε) +H(sε, yε,
2
ε
(yε − xε)) ≥ 0. (3.15)
Conclusion. Subtracting (3.14) and (3.15) yields:
H(tε, xε,
2
ε
(yε − xε))−H(sε, yε,
2
ε
(yε − xε)) ≤ −σ. (3.16)
Using the assumptions on the Hamiltonian, one gets a contradiction by letting ε→ 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Let w1 = V− and w2 = V+. These functions satisfy the assumptions of the comparison
principle (Theorem 3.6). Indeed, we already noticed that the concavity-convexity is a
general property for games with incomplete information. Corollary 3.4 (resp. 3.5) gives
the second (resp. third) assumption. Finally, by definition, one has
V
−(1, x, π) = V+(1, x, π) =
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
πkℓgkℓ(x), ∀(x, π) ∈ Rn ×∆(K × L).
The fact that the Hamiltonian associated to the game H = H+ = H− satisfies the
assumptions in the comparison principle, follows from the Assumption 2.1 and from
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Indeed, there exists c ≥ 0 such that, for any (u, v) ∈ U × V ,
s, t ∈ [0, 1], x, y, ξ,∈ Rn:
|〈f(t, x, u, v), ξ〉 − 〈f(s, y, u, v), ξ〉| ≤ ‖ξ‖‖f(t, x, u, v)− f(s, y, u, v)‖,
≤ ‖ξ‖c (|t− s|+ ‖x− y‖) .
(3.17)
A classical sup inf argument gives then
|H(t, x, ξ)−H(t, y, ξ)| ≤ ‖ξ‖c (|t− s|+ ‖x− y‖) .
Theorem 3.6 applies, so that V− ≥ V+.
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3.5 Application to repeated games
In this paragraph, we deduce from Theorem 3.1 a new characterization for the asymptotic
value of repeated games with incomplete information.
Let I and J be two finite sets, let U := ∆(I) and V := ∆(J) stand for the corresponding
simplexes and let Gkℓ : I × J → R be a matrix game for each (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L. Let
π ∈ ∆(K ×L) be an initial probability and let θ ∈ ∆(N∗) be a measure giving the weight
of each stage. A repeated game with incomplete information is played as follows:
- First, a pair of signals (k, ℓ) is drawn according to π; player 1 is informed of k, player
2 of ℓ.
- Then, at every stage m ≥ 1, knowing the past actions, the players choose actions
(im, jm) ∈ I × J .
Player 1 maximizes
∑
m≥1 θmG
kℓ(im, jm). The existence of the value vθ(π) is straight-
forward. The convergence of vθ(π), as ‖θ‖ := maxm≥1 θm tends to 0, was estab-
lished by Mertens and Zamir [17], for the two classical evaluations θm =
1
n
1m≥n and
θm = λ(1 − λ)
m−1, extended to a general evaluation by Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin
[7], in the independent case, and then to the general case by Oliu-Barton [18, Section 5.4].
The limit, denoted by v( · ), is the unique solution of the Mertens and Zamir [17] system
of functional equations on ∆(K × L):{
w(π) = Cav∆(K)min{uK, wK}(π
K , πL|K)
w(π) = Vex∆(L)max{uL, wL}(π
L, πK|L)
(MZ)
where u : ∆(K × L)→ R is the value of the average (or non-revealing) game:
u(π) = val(u,v)∈U×V
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
πkℓGkℓ(u, v),
which exists by the minmax theorem. Here, Gkℓ is bi-linearly extended to U × V .
Consider now a natural continuous-time analog of the game we just described:
- First, a pair of signals (k, ℓ) is drawn according to π ∈ ∆(K×L), player 1 is informed
of k, player 2 of ℓ.
- Then, the players play a differential game with initial time t0, running payoff G
kℓ
and no dynamic, i.e. there is no state variable.
By stationarity (i.e. there is no dependence on t) one can assume w.l.o.g. that t0 = 0
and thus use the shorter notation A, Ar, B and Br for A(0), Ar(0), B(0) and Br(0)
respectively. The value exists thanks to Theorem 3.1:
W(π) := val(α,β)∈AKr ×BLr E
π
αˆ,βˆ
[∫ 1
0
Gkℓ(uω(s),vω(s))ds
]
.
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The characterization of W will yield a new characterization of v( · ), together with the
equality W(π) = v(π) for all π ∈ ∆(K × L). Start by using he reduction of Section
2.1 (see the Appendix). Define an auxiliary game with initial state x0 ∈ R
K×L, dynamic
f(t, x, u, v) := (Gkℓ(u, v))kℓ, no running payoff and terminal payoff functions g
kℓ(x) = xkℓ,
for each (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L. The state accounts for the cumulated payoff in each one of the
K × L coordinates:
xt =
∫ t
t0
G(u(s),v(s))ds ∈ RK×L,
and the terminal payoff is simply the cumulated payoff corresponding to the true pa-
rameters. This game has a value V(t0, x0, π) by Theorem 3.1. The following proper-
ties are straightforward consequences of the stationarity of the model: for all (t, x, π) ∈
[0, 1]× RK×L ×∆(K × L),
V(t, x, π) = V(t, 0, π) + 〈x, π〉,
V(t, x, π) = (1− t)V(0, x, π),
V(0, 0, π) = W(π).
(3.18)
The next result is a consequence of the the sub-dynamic programming principle (Propo-
sition 3.1), the characterization in Theorem 3.1 and the equalities (3.18).
Proposition 3.2. The map W : ∆(K × L) → R is the unique K-concave and L-convex
Lipschitz continuous function satisfying:
(1) For all Q ∈ ∆(L)K , ζ 7→W♯K(ζ, Q) is a sub-solution of:
−w(ζ) + 〈Dw(ζ), ζ〉+ uK(−Dw(ζ), Q) ≥ 0, on R
K .
(2) For all P ∈ ∆(K)L, η 7→W♭L(P, η) is a super-solution of:
−w(η) + 〈Dw(η), η〉+ uL(P,Dw(η)) ≤ 0, on R
L.
Proof. The K-concavity, L-convexity and Lipschitz continuity of W is a direct conse-
quence of Theorem 3.1 and the relation V(0, 0, π) = W(π). Now, it follows from (3.18)
that, for all (t, x, ζ, Q) ∈ [0, 1)× Rn × RK ×∆(L)K ,
V
♯
K(t, x, ζ, Q) = (1− t)W
♯
K
(
ζ − x(Q)
1− t
, Q
)
, (3.19)
where xk(Q) =
∑
ℓ∈LQ(ℓ|k)x
kℓ, for all k ∈ K. Applying Proposition 3.1 at (t, x) = (0, 0),
one obtains that, for all (ζ, Q) ∈ RK ×∆(L)K and h ∈ [0, 1),
W
♯
K(ζ, Q) ≤ (1− h) inf
β∈B
sup
α∈A
W
♯
K
(
ζ −GQh (α, β)
1− h
,Q
)
, (3.20)
where GQh (α, β) ∈ R
K ,
(GQh (α, β))
k =
∫ h
0
∑
ℓ∈L
Q(ℓ|k)Gkℓ(α(s), β(s))ds.
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By classical arguments, the super-dynamic principle (3.20) implies (1). Reversing the roles
of the players, one obtains (2). Finally, uniqueness follows from a standard comparison
principle.
It is somehow deceiving to characterize W in terms of its upper and lower conjugates.
The next results shows how, from Proposition 3.2, one can recover properties on the
original function.
Corollary 3.7. Let Q0 ∈ ∆(L)
K be fixed, and suppose that ζ 7→ W♯K(ζ, Q0) is differen-
tiable at ζ0 ∈ R
K . Then,
W(p0 ⊗Q0) ≤ u(p0 ⊗Q0), where p0 := −DW
♯
K(ζ0, Q0) ∈ ∆(K).
Proof. Let φ be a test function at ζ0, i.e. φ(ζ) ≥ W
♯
K(ζ, Q0), for all ζ ∈ R
K , with an
equality at ζ0. The differentiability of ζ 7→ W
♯
K(ζ, Q0) at ζ0 implies then that Dφ(ζ0) =
DW
♯
K(ζ0, Q0). Then, by Proposition 3.2 and the choice of p0 one has:
−W♯K(ζ0, Q0) + 〈−p0, ζ0〉+ uK(p0, Q0) ≥ 0. (3.21)
Finally, by Fenchel duality (see Lemma 2.2) one has
W
♯
K(ζ0, Q0) = −WK(p0, Q0) + 〈p0, ζ0〉.
Replacing this expression in (3.21) gives the desired result.
We can now obtain the desired equality.
Corollary 3.8. W(π) = v(π) for all π ∈ ∆(K × L)
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, the differentiability of ζ 7→W♯K(ζ, Q0) at ζ0 ∈ R
K is equivalent to
the fact that p0 := −DW
♯
K(ζ0, Q0) ∈ ∆(K) is an extreme point of p 7→ WK(p,Q0). On
the other hand, anyK-concave, L-convex continuous, bounded function f : ∆(K×L)→ R
is a solution to (MZ) if and only if (see [20, Lemma 4.35]){
f(p⊗Q) ≤ u(p⊗Q), ∀p ∈ Ef(Q),
f(q ⊗ P ) ≥ u(q ⊗ P ), ∀q ∈ Ef(P ),
where Ef(Q) (resp. Ef(P )) is the set of extreme points of fK( ·Q) (resp. fL( ·P )). By
Corollary 3.7, W is thus a solution of the Mertens-Zamir system of functional equations.
The solution being unique [17, Theorem 2.1], one obtains W = v.
Corollary 3.8 and Proposition 3.2 provide a new characterization for the asymptotic
value v( · ) of repeated games with incomplete information.
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Appendix
Let us describe precisely the standard transformation from a Bolza to a Mayer problem,
which allows to assume without loss of generality, that there is no running payoff. The
past controls being commonly observed, both players can compute the K × L potential
integral payoffs and positions induced by the pair (u,v) ∈ U(t0)×V(t0) at time t ∈ [t0, 1]:∫ t
t0
γkℓ(s,xkℓ[t0, x
kℓ
0 ,u,v](s),u(s),v(s))ds, (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L
x
kℓ[t0, x
kℓ
0 ,u,v](t), (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L.
Define a new state variable in (R × Rn)K×L which contains this information. Let the
dynamic be given by:
F : [0, 1]× (R× Rn)K×L × U × V → (R× Rn)K×L,
F kℓ
(
t, (ykℓ, xkℓ)(k,ℓ), u, v
)
=
(
γkℓ(t, xkℓ, u, v), fkℓ(t, xkℓ, u, v)
)
.
Define new terminal payoff functions by setting, for each (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L,
Gkℓ : (R× Rn)K×L → R,
Gkℓ((yk,ℓ, xkℓ)(k,ℓ)) = y
kℓ + gkℓ(xkℓ).
Let N = (1 + n)|K||L| and let X0 := (0, x
kℓ
0 )(k,ℓ)∈K×L ∈ R
N . The regularity of f , γ and
g ensures that F and Gkℓ satisfy Assumption 2.1, for each (k, ℓ). Define an auxiliary
differential game with asymmetric information as follows: before the game starts, (k, ℓ) ∈
K×L is drawn according to π; k (resp. ℓ) is told to player 1 (resp. 2). Then, the standard
differential game
(X0, F, 0, (G
kℓ)k,ℓ)
is played. This game is equivalent to G(t0, π) since any couple of controls (u,v) ∈ U(t0)×
V(t0) induces the same payoff in both games.
In view of this reduction, with no loss of generality we may focus on games satisfying
(a) and (b). The following assumption holds in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 3.9. There exists z ∈ Rn and φ : [0, 1]×Rn×U×V → Rn such that xkℓ0 = z
and fkℓ = φ, for all (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L. Moreover, γ ≡ 0.
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